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Abstract
We use results from the literature on the determinants of price-cost
margins to derive an equation relating labor’s share of national income to
the in‡ation rate (as well as to the output gap, the unemployment rate
and the capital stock per worker). The equation is tested with a panel
of 15 OECD countries. We obtain a robust positive relationship between
in‡ation and the labor share. Our results suggest that disin‡ation is not
distributively neutral, provide empirical support for the distinct concern
about price stability shown by trade unions and employers’ organizations,
and help explaining the negative impact of in‡ation on growth.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Disin‡ation during the eighties and the nineties has been accompanied by a sig-
ni…cant rise in the pro…t share of national income in most OECD countries (Blan-
chard, 1997) or, equivalently, by a reduction in the labor share (see Figure 1).
This suggests the possibility that disin‡ation -or more generally, changes in the
level of in‡ation- could be non-neutral with respect to the distribution of income.
In fact, low-in‡ation oriented central banks have traditionally been character-
ized as ”conservative”. Furthermore, the distinct concern about in‡ation shown
by employers’ organizations in comparison to the one exhibited by trade unions
can be rationalized only if one assumes that in‡ation has a di¤erent impact on
their income. The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the possible e¤ect of
in‡ation on factor shares.
The literature on the distributive impact of in‡ation has typically focused on
personal income inequality. The issue has been investigated by using informa-
tion on the quintiles distribution of familiar income, or either by means of some
m e a s u r eo fi n c o m ed i s p e r s i o nl i k et h eG i n ic o e ¢ c i e n t ,a n dt h er e s u l t sh a v eb e e n
somehow inconclusive.1 By contrast, the analysis of the impact of in‡ation on
the functional distribution of income has received almost no academic attention,
despite its great importance. Basically, this importance derives from the fact
that social agents intervening in the political economy of monetary policy and
the …ght against in‡ation -like trade unions and employers’ organizations- are
mostly de…ned in terms of their type of income. Hence from a positive political
economy point of view, analyzing the impact of in‡ation on the factor shares is a
key issue. On the other hand, the means by which in‡ation may a¤ect personal
income inequality can be due to a large extent to the fact that di¤erent types of
income are di¤erently a¤ected by in‡ation, and that the composition of income
(between wages, pro…ts, interests and others) is very di¤erent across individuals
and systematically related to total income. Thus the consequences of in‡ation
upon inequality may largely be the indirect result of the e¤ects of in‡ation upon
factor shares.
In the following we study the determinants of the labor share in a panel
of 15 OECD countries with data from 1960 to 1999. Our results indicate that
1See Blinder and Esaki (1978), Jantti (1994), Sarel (1997) and Bulir (1998). They respec-
tively …nd that the distributive impact of in‡ation is weak progressive, signi…cant progressive,
non-signi…cant, and regressive.
2in‡ation is a robust positively signed determinant of the labor share. This positive
e¤ect comes up in pooled estimations as well as in almost all country-speci…c
estimations.
This result suggest that the eventual bene…ts of low in‡ation are not equally
shared by all production factors, at least in the short and medium run. As a con-
sequence, it provides new foundations for the in‡ationary bias that -according
to some macroeconomic models- trade unions may cause, and makes the case for
going further than the representative agent model to analyze the overall conse-
quences of monetary policy and disin‡ation. On the other hand, it helps explain-
ing the negative impact of in‡ation on capital growth. The literature on this
topic has pointed at two channels of in‡uence to produce this negative e¤ect:
the e¢ciency channel by which in‡ation would lower total factor productivity;
and the accumulation e¤ect by which in‡ation would lower investment, at least
temporarily (see Andrés and Hernando,1999, and the references therein). The
reduction that in‡ation operates in the capital share -according to our results-
may explain this negative e¤ect on investment.
The empirical study is framed into a simple theoretical model that builds to a
large extent on the relationship between in‡ation and market power thoroughly
investigated by the staggered pricing literature. In the next section we lay out
the arguments. In Section 3 we proceed to the empirical analysis. In the last
Section we summarize and o¤er some concluding comments.
2 Theoretical Framework
Let Y be output, L labor, k ´ K=L capital per worker, p output price, w nominal
wage, and ¹ the markup over marginal costs. We assume a degree-one homoge-
neous production function, and a monopolistic competition economy implying a
markup-over-marginal-costs pricing equation:













3where ! is real wage (! = w=p), and ©(k) ´ 1 ¡ k[F 0(k)=F(k)]: Hence, to-
gether with technology, variables a¤ecting …rms’ margins determine the relative
distribution of net output between capital and labor.2
The literature on price determination shows that markups may depend on
a series of factors like industry concentration, collusion, demand elasticity, and
potential entry. Most changes on these variables are likely to show a uncorrelated
idiosyncratic pro…le across industries. Nonetheless, they may simultaneously be
a¤ected by the business cycle. Hence from the macroeconomic perspective, the
business cycle is a potentially important determinant of average margins, though
their overall cyclical behavior is still under discussion (see Rotemberg and Wood-
ford, 1999). Furthermore, to the extent that agreements between unions and
employers are e¢cient -i.e., they simultaneously set both wages and employment-
markups also depend on unions’ bargaining power and the elasticity of substi-
tution between wage and employment in unions’ preferences (Dowrick, 1990; see
also Kalecki, 1954). Since higher unemployment is likely to decrease both union’s
bargaining power and the substitutability of employment by wages, it may also
constitute a signi…cant macroeconomic determinant of markups. In particular,
we may expect a positive relationship between markups and the unemployment
rate.3
Besides those variables usually considered as determinants of margins, we are
most interested in the series of arguments suggesting that in‡ation may a¤ect
markups and real pro…ts. First, …xed costs of price adjustments imply that
staggered pricing following (S;s) rules are optimal; where S and s are relative
prices of output with respect to marginal costs (Sheshinsky and Weiss, 1977 and
1983). With higher steady in‡ation, both limits S and s tend to increase. In the
case of monopolistic …rms, this will result in higher or in lower average markups
depending on the form of the pro…t and demand functions, and the discounting
rate (Konieczny, 1990, and Benabou and Konieczny, 1994).
Second, with more than one …rm, steady in‡ation will tend to increase com-
2Kalecki (1938) and (1954) was probably the …rst to propose a theory of the aggregate
income distribution hinging on the determinants of …rms’ market power.
3The relevant unemployment rate for markups at time t is likely to be the one corresponding
to time t ¡ 1, since wages are usually negotiated one period in advance. The same would
occur if the relevant unemployment rate is the one expected for the next period, but adaptive
expectations are used. In any case, due to the strong inertia shown by the unemployment
rate in all countries, our empirical results are almost identical whatever we use lagged or
contemporaneous unemployment rates.
4petition. The higher the in‡ation rate, the wider will be the S-s spread. Hence,
with uncoordinated price increases, higher in‡ation gives rise to a wider price dis-
persion that o¤ers room for more intense consumer search. This in turn creates
incentives for more competition that tends to lower down margins over marginal
costs. Moreover, markups in the lower segments of every …rm S-s cycle receive
higher weights -in terms of sales- when computing average margins (Benabou,
1988 and 1992a).4 At the empirical level, Benabou (1992b) obtained evidence
of a negative relationship between markups and the level of in‡ation, as well as
on the non-signi…cance of in‡ation uncertainty, using data from the USA retail
trade sector.
Furthermore, some other elements can add to a negative e¤ect of in‡ation
upon pro…ts per unit of output. First to the extent that markup pricing by …rms
is not always applied on replacement or expected costs, but on historical costs,5
in‡ation reduces …rms’ capitalization and real pro…ts. Second, higher in‡ation
rises several costs such as the menu ones. Though these cost increases could
reduce the marginal productivity of labor -and therefore, real wages- in the same
proportion as pro…ts, so that factor shares would be unaltered, inasmuch as they
take the form of higher …xed costs they will tend reduce pro…ts relatively to
wages (at least in the short and medium run). Third, sluggish price adjustment
due to menu costs implies a higher average distance with respect to the optimal
price, thus reducing pro…ts. And …nally, the non-neutralities with respect to
in‡ation built in most countries’ tax systems biases capital allocation towards
less pro…table, but …scally less exposed, investments.
According to all these arguments we consider the following equation on the
markup determinants:
¹ = ¹(¼;y;u¡¿); (4)
4In opposition to this result, it has been argued that in‡ation variability may reduce the
value of information that is obtained by search, therefore reducing it and increasing …rms’
market power (see, for instance, Tommasi, 1994). Thus, to the extent that higher in‡ation
tends to imply higher uncertainty about the price level, there would be a countervailing force
against the negative relationship between in‡ation and margins. Nonetheless, Benabou and
Gertner (1993) show that the sign of this uncertainty e¤ect is ambiguous, and that it depends
on the possibility of acquiring more information.
5Valuation of inputs on a historical basis has been the only method legally admitted in many
countries in order to ful…ll legal accounting obligations, and to compute costs and pro…ts. Some
portion of …rms may then be induced to use this misleading information on costs to set prices.
5where ¼ is the in‡ation rate, y is the output gap, and u¡¿ is (¿) lagged unem-





Now, log-linearizing this equation we have:
lns = °0 + °1 ln¼ + °2 lny + °3 lnu¡¿ + °4 lnk (6)
Our previous discussion imply a likely positive sign for the impact of in‡ation
on the labor share, and a negative sign for the elasticity on unemployment. On the
other hand, the literature on the cyclical behavior of markups does not provide
de…nitive results for °2. Though the usual correlation obtained between contem-
poraneous output gap and the labor share has been negative (see Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1999, and the references therein). Finally there are no theoretical
restrictions on the sign of the derivative of ©(k),a n dt h e r e f o r eo n°4.
A side comment on the likely (very) long run e¤ects of in‡ation may be con-
venient. Inasmuch as @¹=@¼ is negative, higher in‡ation will tend to bring about
lower pro…ts. In the case of monopolistic competition industries with no barriers
to entry -i.e., with no monopoly power in the long run- an average in‡ation higher
than the expected at the time of carrying out …xed investments may give rise to
persistent losses and, therefore, to a reduction in the long run number of …rms.
The smaller number of …rms may in turn induce less consumer search (Diamond,
1993) and may sustain in the long run an equilibrium with higher markups. This,
together with the reduction in the ine¢ciencies resulting from monopolistic com-
petition with increasing returns to scale (Benabou, 1987 and 1993) may -at least,
to some extent- o¤set the initial rise in the labor share caused by in‡ation. Hence
the impact on the labor share of a permanent increase in the average level of in‡a-
tion, may lower in the long run. This would be consistent with the negative e¤ect
of in‡ation on investment and growth being only temporary, as suggested by the
in‡ation-and-growth literature. Symmetrically, the rise in pro…ts prompted by
disin‡ation may last for a fairly long time but may be not permanent, since it
would likely be followed by an increase in industries’ capacity which would even-
tually work against the markup increase. This hypothesis could deserve some
speci…c empirical work in the future.
63 Empirical Analysis
The labor share was computed in two di¤erent ways. The …rst series was ob-
tained as the ratio of employees’ compensation in the business sector to the value
added in the business sector at factor prices. In the second choice we added
to the employees’ compensation, the labor income imputed to the self-employed
individuals, obtained by multiplying their number by the average wage in the
business sector. Both series give rise to very similar estimations. The results we
report correspond to the …rst de…nition of the labor share. In‡ation is computed
using the Consumer Price Index; i.e., 1+¼it ´ CPIit=CPIit¡1. The output gap
yit is de…ned as Yit=Y it,w h e r eYit is country i0s total output at time t and Y it is
Hodrick-Prescott detrended output (with the usual smoothing parameter).
The main data source is the OECD Economic Outlook data diskette. CPI data
are from the Main Economic Indicators. The capital stock is from De la Fuente
and Doménech (2000) which is obtained from the OECD data on investment,
enlarged from below by using other complementary sources, and correcting for
di¤erences in PPP. Oil prices -which are used only as an instrument- are from
IMF Financial Statistics.
We carried out two blocks of estimations. In the …rst block we pool the 15
OECD countries for which we have an almost complete time series during the
period 1960-99,6. In the second block we perform country-speci…c estimates of
t h es a m ee q u a t i o nt oc h e c kt h er o b u s t n e s so fo u rr e s u l t s .
3.1 Pooled Estimations
As noted by Judson and Owen (1996), the …xed e¤ects model is generally more
appropriate than the random e¤ects model for many macro dataset. There are
two reasons. First, the individual e¤ects are likely to be correlated with the other
regressors whenever they are substituting for omitted variables. And second, the
selected group of countries considered in this paper -as usually occurs- is far from
being a random sample of countries. From (6), the …xed e¤ects model to be
6We limited our study to those OECD countries for which we had at least a 25 years
complete time series set. This left us with 16 countries. From these we excluded Norway since
many economic variables -such as the labor share- have a very idiosyncratic path due to the
very erratic value of the oil and natural gas production which accounts up to the 20% of the
business sector output in some years.
7estimated is:
lnsit = °0i + °1 ln(1 + ¼it)+°2 lnuit¡1 + °3 lnyit + °4 lnkit + "it (7)
where °0i is country i0s …xed-e¤ect, and "it is the random disturbance.
In Table I we report the results for equation (7) estimations with di¤erent
methods. The …rst column correspond to the Least Squares Dummy Variable
estimator (LSDV). These estimations are obtained under the assumption that
errors are contemporaneously uncorrelated and cross-section -as well as time-
series- homoskedastic. The second column correspond to the results obtained with
the Seemingly Unrelated Equations estimator (SUR); i.e., assuming that residuals
are both cross-section heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated. As it
can be observed, all the explanatory variables are statistically very signi…cant in
both estimations, and have the expected signs whenever we had any hypothesis
at all (i.e., for all variables except k). Moreover, coe¢cient estimates are fairly
similar for the two methods. To get a grasp on the quantitative importance of the
positive e¤ect of in‡ation, note that with an estimated coe¢cient of 0.71 and a
labor share of about 65% of the national income, going from an average in‡ation
of 5% to an average in‡ation of 2% would reduce the labor share in about 1.3
percent points.
Simultaneous determination of the explained variable and regressors could
cause some endogeneity problems to our estimations. In order to evaluate the
quantitative e¤ect of this potential problem we carry out two GMM estimations
with di¤erent sets of instruments. In principle, the use of instrumental variables
can deal with the endogeneity problem, Although the GMM is sometimes subject
to skepticism since in practice it is di¢cult to …nd appropriate instruments, these
estimations may provide an additional test on the robustness of our results.
Taking the …rst di¤erence of (7) to eliminate °0i,w eh a v e
¢lnsit = °1¢ln(1+¼it)+°2¢lnuit¡1 + °3¢lnyit + °4¢lnkit +¢ "it (8)
The natural instruments are lags of regressors. Assuming that "it is serially un-
correlated, lags of regressors dated t¡2 and earlier are valid instruments (except
for the output gap since, by construction, the Hodrick-Prescott …lter implies that
we should use an unreasonable number of lags to avoid any correlation between
errors and instruments). We use two di¤erent sets of predetermined instruments:
IV1 and IV2.T h es e tI V 1 includes two-periods lagged unemployment growth rate,
8in‡ation rate, capital-labor ratio, and GDP growth rate, as well as the growth
rate of the oil nominal price lagged two and three periods. IV2 includes two-
periods lags of the level as well as of the …rst di¤erence of the unemployment
rate, the in‡ation rate and the capital-labor ratio; and also the nominal price of
oil lagged two and three periods.7 Results are reported in the third and fourth
columns of Table 1. As it can be observed, signs and statistical signi…cance for
the in‡ation and the output gap are the same; and the quantitative values of their
coe¢cients change only slightly. The signs of the two other variables are also the
same, but the unemployment rate becomes not signi…cant with the second set
of instruments; and the capital-labor ratio is not signi…cant with either of the
instrument sets.
The di¤erences between the GMM results and those previously obtained by
the SUR method can be statistically compared by means of the Hausman-Wu
test. The null hypothesis is that the regressors in equation (7) are exogenous.
Probabilities for this test are 0.097 and 0.098 for IV1 and IV2, respectively. Hence
we do not reject the null hypothesis in any of the two cases. Therefore, the
potential endogeneity problem does not seem to cause any signi…cant bias in the
coe¢cient estimates using the SUR method.
In order to check for the robustness of the e¤ect of in‡ation under di¤erent
speci…cations, we also performed estimations alternatively eliminating the rest of
explanatory variables. Results are reported in Table 2. As it can be observed,
in‡ation was always found to be positive and very signi…cant, and the coe¢cients
obtained were quite similar to those in Table 1. Hence the estimated impact of
in‡ation does not seem to depend on the choice of any particular set of additional
explanatory variables.
3.2 Country-Speci…c Estimations
Figure 1 suggests that the in‡ation rate, besides being a signi…cant variable in
pooled estimates of the labor share, can also be an important factor explaining
the evolution of the labor share in every of most OECD countries. We now esti-
mate equation (6) for each country, yet allowing in the estimation procedure for
the error terms to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated between
7These two sets of instruments work statistically well since we do not reject the overiden-
tifying restrictions in either case. The p-values for the Sargan test are, respectively, 0.07 and
0.14.
9countries (i.e., we use the SUR estimation method). In this way we take account
of the common shocks to all countries -as the oil ones- that occurred during the
period encompassed by our data. The equation to be estimated is:
lnsit = °0i + °1i ln(1 + ¼it)+°2i lnuit¡1 + °3i lnyit + °4i lnkit + "it: (9)
Figure 2 suggests that equation (9) o¤ers a fairly good approximation to the
evolution of the labor share between 1960 and 1999 for most countries in our
sample. Numerical results are reported in Table 3. As this table shows, in‡ation
has a positive signi…cant e¤ect on the labor share in all countries, with the only
exception of Austria and Denmark where in‡ation does not have a statistically
signi…cant impact.
Results for the rest of variables are less uniform. The output gap has a neg-
ative statistically signi…cant coe¢cient in eight countries, and it is not a statis-
tically signi…cant variable in the remaining seven countries. The unemployment
rate has a signi…cant negative sign in ten countries. On the other hand, it is not
signi…cant in three countries, and shows a positive signi…cant sign in two cases.
Finally, the e¤ect of the capital-labor ratio on the labor share di¤ers across coun-
tries.
4 Concluding Comments
Our results show a robust positive relationship between the level of in‡ation and
the labor share. This relationship comes up in the pooled estimations, as well
as in almost all country-speci…c estimations. Furthermore, our results con…rm
the negative relationship between the labor share and contemporaneous output
gap usually found in the literature, and point -in pooled estimations and in most
individual cases- to a signi…cant negative relationship between the labor share
and unemployment.
It may be hypothesized, however, that the positive impact of in‡ation on the
labor share could lessen in the very long run. Inasmuch as in‡ation lowers margins
a n di n c r e a s e s… x e dc o s t s ,c h a n g e si nt h el o n gr u na v e r a g el e v e lo fi n ‡ a t i o nm a y
bring about long run changes in the structure of some industries. These changes
may help recovering to some extent the initial markups, and reducing the e¤ects
of in‡ation on the labor share. Whatever is the case, since changes in industries
structure may take a fairly long time, any reasonable rate of time preference
10would likely bring about a signi…cant present value of the distributive impact of
in‡ation.
The implications of these results for the political economy of monetary policy
seem to be considerable, since they provide empirical support for the distinct
concern shown by trade unions and di¤erent political parties with regard to price
stability. They suggest that the …ght against in‡ation, though likely bene…cial
for aggregate output and growth, may involve more controversial issues -at least
in the short and medium run- than usually considered. This is rather unfortunate
since the role of economists as political advisers becomes more embarrassing when
economic policies are likely to have distributive e¤ects, than when it is possible
to o¤er free lunch policies providing Pareto improvements. On the other hand,
these results help explaining the negative e¤ect that in‡ation seems to have on
investment and growth.
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13Table 1
Results for Di¤erent EstimationMethods

































Adj: R2 0:77 0:76 ¡¡
Note: Dependent variable is labor share. All variables are in logs. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢cient estimates. The data
correspond to an unbalanced panel of 15 OECD countries over period 1960-99.
Total number of observations are 514 for the OLS and SUR estimation.For the
Instrumental Variable estimation (IV1,IV2) the number of observations are 478
and 488 respectively. In the instrumental variable estimation we use White‘s
Heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
14Table 2


























Adj: R2 0:76 0:74 0:75 0:74 0:74
Note. Dependent variable is labor share. The …rst column of results corre-
spond to the baseline (i.e., the SUR estimation in Table 1). The rest of columns
correspond to the alternative elimination of the rest of the explanatory variables
but the in‡ation rate, in the estimated equation. All variables are in logs. The
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢cient estimates. The data
correspond to an unbalanced panel of 15 OECD countries over period 1960-98.
Total number of observations are 522 for the …rst and the third columns, 514 for










































































































































































Note. Dependent variable is labor share. All variables are in logs. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢cient estimates. Errors for
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Figure 1. Inflation and labor share in OECD countries over the period 1960-99*
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Figure 2. Actual and fitted Labor share in OECD countries*
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